1. Introduction

The energy industry is without doubt one of the principal engines of economic development. Activity generated by energy production and distribution is the biggest and most important economic sector in many countries. This industry is particularly important in Mexico, where oil and gas production is a major source of government income, accounting for a third of all federal revenue.2 The industry's importance is reflected in the fact that revenue related to hydrocarbons constitutes a category apart in the federal budget, distinguished from other revenue.3 Mexico's dependence on the oil and gas industry means that developments in that industry stimulate growth across the entire Mexican economy.

In order to maximize the benefits deriving from the energy sector,4 the Mexican government recently reformed its law in order to increase energy production through private investment. In December 2013, the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States (Mexican Constitution) was amended to create a new legal regime specifically for the production and distribution of energy (hereinafter the 'Constitutional Amendment'). In particular, a fundamental change was made with respect to natural resources, such as hydrocarbons, in order to expressly allow and encourage private sector investment (including foreign investment) and participation in the energy sector, which the Constitution had prohibited since the 1940s.


The Constitutional Amendment is considered to be one of the most significant changes in Mexican law in the last hundred years. It is also marked by social and historical factors. Ever since the Mexican Revolution in the early years of the twentieth century, ownership of the country's natural resources has been an important issue for the Mexican people. Originally, the Constitution provided that the Mexican nation owned the country's hydrocarbons and that the exploration, extraction and production of those resources were strategic activities5 reserved for the Mexican government. Hence, private investment (national or foreign) was not allowed in the sector. While ensuring that Mexico's hydrocarbons remained under the ownership of the Mexican nation, the Constitutional Amendment opened the sector to investment by allowing agreements between the government and private entities.

The sixth paragraph of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, as amended, reads:

In the case of petroleum and solid, liquid or gaseous underground hydrocarbons, national ownership is inalienable and perennial. No concessions regarding hydrocarbons will be granted. In order to raise revenue for the state, to contribute to the nation's long-term development, the exploration and extraction of oil and other hydrocarbons shall be carried out through assignments to state-owned productive enterprises or through contracts with them or the private sector, in accordance with the terms of the relevant regulation. To meet the objectives of such assignments or contracts, state-owned productive enterprises may contract with the private sector. In any event, subsurface hydrocarbons are the property of the nation and this must be stated in the assignments and contracts.

These provisions reconcile historical and social considerations with the need to increase the yield of the energy industry through private investment.

The implementation of the Constitutional Amendment led to the enactment or amendment of over twenty laws and regulations (which, together with the Constitutional Amendment, we shall refer to as the Energy Reform).6 However, these new or amended statutes modified [Page411:] certain aspects of the legal regime in a way that may in time undermine the purpose of the Energy Reform, which is to encourage investment in the sector.

This article discusses the different dispute resolution mechanisms provided in Mexico's new energy laws and their impact on the Energy Reform as a whole.

2. Purpose of the Energy Reform

According to the federal government, the overall purpose of the Energy Reform was to maximize the benefits deriving from natural resources by encouraging private investment in the sector and to ensure that those benefits can be enjoyed by future generations. The immediate aim was to promote competition, so as to achieve a reduction in oil and electricity prices through open market conditions rather than a state monopoly. The Energy Reform was built around the following premises, announced by Mexico's President in his declaration on the purpose of the Constitutional Amendment:

(i) strengthening of the government's steering role by giving regulatory bodies new legal and administrative tools allowing them to define and pursue energy policies through appropriate and careful administration of Mexico's resources;

(ii) economic growth through investment, the creation of new employment opportunities and a reduction in raw material prices as a result of competition and a larger supply;

(iii) improvement in the quality of life and equal opportunities for the Mexican population through better access to energy;

(iv) continuous and affordable supply of energy for present and future generations;

(v) greater public information and transparency in the administration of the energy sector and natural resources;

(vi) reduction in the negative impact of fossil fuels by encouraging clean and renewable sources of energy.

3. Status of PEMEX and CFE before and after the Energy Reform

One of the most important changes brought about by the Energy Reform was the complete transformation of the nature and governance of the entities previously in charge of exploiting the energy sector. Prior to the Energy Reform, the sector was entirely under the control of the government, which acted through two agencies, PEMEX (Petroleos Mexicanos) and the Federal Electricity Commission, CFE (Comisión Federal de Electricidad). PEMEX had a monopoly over the exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons, while the CFE had a monopoly over [Page412:] the generation, sale and distribution of electricity.7 Both entities were organized in accordance with administrative laws and managed as part of the federal government. Hence, their legal relations were governed by administrative law and the principles of public law. The involvement of private enterprises was limited to certain activities outsourced through administrative agreements between PEMEX or CFE and the private sector. Private enterprises did not participate directly in the energy sector as competitors of PEMEX or CFE, but only as private contractors assisting PEMEX and CFE in the development of certain activities. Now, however, private sector enterprises are no longer limited to outsourced work in support of the activities of PEMEX and CFE, but may participate as competitors of PEMEX and CFE, although in the electricity sector their participation is limited to the generation of electric energy and does not extend to the supply and distribution of electricity to the final consumer, which still remains the preserve of the CFE.

In order to achieve proper competition between private investors and government entities (PEMEX and CFE), it was necessary to modify the legal status of those entities. No longer are they government agencies regulated by administrative laws and managed by Mexico's federal government, but instead have a status more akin to that of private companies. They are now referred to as state-owned productive enterprises (Empresas Productivas del Estado), which situates them midway between a government entity and a private corporation. In other words, they belong to the government but participate in the market as private competitors. Hence, they are administered independently of the government and their assets are not subject to government decisions. They are also managed along the lines of a private company rather than a state-owned entity.8

This is a welcome change. In practice it means that these entities can now enter into all kinds of agreements with the private sector, and those agreements will be governed by commercial laws and principles rather than administrative law and the principles of public law.9 It also has a very positive effect on the applicability of ADR mechanisms in disputes related to the energy sector. Previously, all agreements executed by the federal government and entities under its control (including PEMEX and CFE) were governed by administrative laws, in particular the Law on Government Procurement, Leasing and Services and the Law on [Page413:] Public Works and Related Services. Both of these laws excluded the arbitration of disputes over termination by public authority of any agreement with the federal government or an entity under its control.10 Now, fortunately, neither of these laws is applicable to agreements entered into by state-owned productive enterprises, so the arbitration of disputes over the unilateral termination of such agreements is no longer prohibited, except, as will be described below, where those agreements concern the exploration or extraction of hydrocarbons.

4. Hydrocarbon exploration/extraction agreements

Private participation in the energy sector can be achieved, broadly speaking, in one of two ways: either through an agreement with a state-owned productive enterprise or by authorization from the government bodies that regulate the sector. When a private investor wishes to participate in the exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons, the investment presupposes an agreement with either PEMEX or the National Hydrocarbons Commission11 which is the government body responsible for allocating exploration and extraction contracts to private parties. The Mexican Constitution and the Hydrocarbons Law do not specify the regulations governing those contracts. The Constitution simply states that the agreements between the National Hydrocarbons Commission and private parties are regulated by the Mexican Congress and shall include production sharing agreements, profit sharing agreements, licence agreements and service agreements.12 Each type of agreement provides for a different kind of consideration, as defined in the Hydrocarbons Revenue Law.

In production sharing contracts, the consideration consists of a percentage of the product obtained from performing the contract; in profit sharing contracts it consists of a percentage of the profits obtained from performing the agreement; in licence contracts it is the transmission of ownership of the hydrocarbons obtained from performing the contract, against payment; and in services contracts the federal government or PEMEX pays the private party in cash for the services outsourced to it.

5. Dispute resolution under the Energy Reform

The new laws enacted as part of the Energy Reform do not provide for a single unified method of dispute resolution. This is perhaps due to the different legal situations covered and the diverse interests to which they give rise. The Energy Reform foresees two main systems of dispute resolution: (i) alternative dispute resolution independent of [Page414:] the state, such as institutional or ad hoc arbitration; and (ii) dispute resolution before a Mexican state authority, which may be part of either the executive or the judicial branch of government.

5.1. Private ADR mechanisms

As a general rule, the application of private commercial law to the agreements made with state-owned productive enterprises opens up the possibility for parties to agree on the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms. The Mexican Constitution recognizes, moreover, that this possibility is a human right deriving directly from the human right of access to justice.13 In practice, it means that agreements with state-owned productive enterprises can provide for any kind of ADR mechanism, allowing parties to choose whichever ADR mechanism best suits their situation, unless it is expressly excluded by a regulation. Unfortunately, as will be seen below, an exception has been created for agreements relating to the exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons.

5.2. Arbitrability of energy-related disputes

Although recourse to alternative dispute resolution was an obvious consequence of the applicability of private commercial law, the Mexican Congress chose to make it doubly clear by including in Article 115 of the PEMEX Law and in Article 118 of the CFE Law wording that confirms that PEMEX, CFE and their subsidiaries can agree to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, arbitral clauses and arbitral agreements in accordance with applicable commercial legislation and international treaties to which Mexico is a party. These statutes also state that parties to deeds or agreements that have effects, or have to be executed, outside Mexico may agree on the application of foreign law and the submission of disputes to foreign courts or to an arbitral tribunal seated outside Mexico.

The Hydrocarbons Law also expressly authorizes parties to submit disputes to ADR mechanisms14 within the limits of the subject matter of the law, i.e. the regulation of hydrocarbons. The act states that any disputes arising from agreements relating to the exploration or extraction of hydrocarbons can be subject to ADR, which includes arbitration pursuant to the Mexican Code of Commerce, or to any other ADR mechanisms foreseen in international treaties to which Mexico is a party.

Allowing disputes to be submitted to any ADR mechanisms represents a significant advance over the former regime, under which the only ADR mechanism available to PEMEX and the CFE was arbitration and even then it was limited to certain types of disputes. In other words, before [Page415:] the Energy Reform, energy-related disputes with government entities could be settled by state courts or, in some cases, by arbitration,15 but could not be submitted to any other ADR mechanism.

The acceptance of ADR as a normal means of resolving energy disputes could only help to achieve the objectives of the Energy Reform, for it is likely to be an important consideration for many potential private investors contemplating agreements with the state-owned productive enterprises. However, while this development applies without qualification in the electricity industry, when it comes to hydrocarbons there are unfortunately several problems and inconsistencies, as explained in the following sections.

5.3. Impediment to arbitration of disputes arising out of agreements on hydrocarbon exploration and extraction

The Achilles' heel of the ADR provisions in the new Mexican energy laws is, without doubt, the unjustified exclusion of arbitration for disputes over the unilateral termination of agreements for the exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons (rescisión administrativa de contratos para la exploración y extracción de hidrocarburos). As mentioned earlier, the National Hydrocarbons Commission is a government entity which, among other things, is in charge of the allocation, execution and termination of contracts relating to the exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons. The Hydrocarbons Law contains a provision authorizing parties to submit disputes to any ADR mechanisms. At the same time, however, it excludes the use of arbitration for disputes related to contract termination by public authority (rescisión administrativa). It also states that the application of Mexican laws to the substance of the dispute cannot be waived, that arbitration must be conducted in Spanish and that arbitration in equity is forbidden.16

One possible reason for placing the unilateral termination of hydrocarbon exploration and extraction agreements outside the scope of arbitration is that under the Constitutional Amendment17 the ownership of hydrocarbons remains unchanged, i.e. they continue to belong to the Mexican nation. The unilateral termination of an agreement for the exploration and extraction of hydrocarbons is intended to allow the government entity to recover rights given to the private sector. Were arbitration permissible, the immediate recovery of those rights would not be guaranteed. The approach taken by the Mexican government was to follow the principle of exclusive state ownership of hydrocarbons and the non-transferability of that ownership. In other words, the Mexican Congress can be said to have considered the ownership of hydrocarbons as a matter of public policy.


The fact that arbitration (or other ADR mechanisms) is permitted in some situations but forbidden in others results in an unjustified lack of uniformity in the legal regime applicable to the energy sector and creates legal uncertainty which undermines the purpose of the Energy Reform. Given that this restriction may discourage potential investors, it should be eliminated, so as to create greater consistency and clarity with respect to rights and duties appertaining to investment in the energy sector in Mexico.

The right of the National Hydrocarbons Commission to terminate an agreement relating to the exploration or extraction of hydrocarbons is not discretionary, but may be exercised only in presence of one of the causes listed in the Hydrocarbons Law, all of which are considered to constitute breaches of the agreement justifying unilateral termination.

Nevertheless, private investors are not entirely without recourse against unilateral termination. Pursuant to Article 20 of the Hydrocarbons Law, once the National Hydrocarbons Commission has notified the contractor of the termination of the agreement, the contractor has 30 days to file a defence before the National Hydrocarbons Commission, which must decide whether termination is justified within 90 days. If it decides that there was due cause for terminating the agreement, the contractor can contest the decision in a federal court.18

5.4. Scope of the arbitrability limitation

The Hydrocarbons Law would appear to be clear in its affirmation that disputes related to unilateral termination by the National Hydrocarbons Commission cannot be settled through arbitration. However, it does not specify what falls within the scope of this restriction, referring simply to Article 20 of the Hydrocarbons Law, which in turn refers to unilateral termination based on statutory or administrative grounds, or contractual grounds,19 so it is not completely clear whether the restriction covers the arbitrability of termination only or its consequences, too.

If, as we explained above, the purpose of prohibiting ADR in exploration and extraction agreements is to protect public ownership of hydrocarbons as a matter of public policy, then it is arguable that the limitation on the use of arbitration should apply only when that ownership is in jeopardy. In other words, the restriction should be considered applicable only to the National Hydrocarbons Commission's act of terminating the agreement, and not to the consequences of that [Page417:] act, which may or may not be matters of public policy. For instance, it is reasonable to think that a dispute over damages caused to a private contractor by unjustified unilateral termination could be subject to arbitration or any other ADR mechanism.

In summary, we believe that the exclusion of ADR for disputes over unilateral termination should not prevent other issues related to unilateral termination being submitted to arbitration, so long as they do not endanger national ownership of the hydrocarbons. Unfortunately, there is as yet no case law in support of this interpretation. On the other hand, a decision has been rendered in which the non-arbitrability of disputes over unilateral termination extended to the causes and effects of termination, preventing disputes over these matters from being settled through arbitration, too.20 This case reached the conclusion that the unilateral termination of the contract renders the arbitration clause ineffective.

5.5. ADR clause in current hydrocarbon exploration/extraction agreements

At the time of writing,21 the National Hydrocarbons Commission has already started performing its duties under the Energy Reform. It is currently negotiating several production sharing contracts and licence agreements with private bidders. The agreements that are being negotiated are available online22 and, although they are frequently being modified, they all contain a model dispute resolution clause,23 which provides for conciliation and arbitration as the standard dispute resolution mechanisms.

The first component of the dispute resolution clause is voluntary conciliation, to which the parties can submit any disputes (other than those relating to unilateral termination) prior to arbitration. The conciliation provision in the production sharing contracts is very different from that in the licence agreements. The production sharing contracts foresee a completely voluntary conciliation proceeding that will take place only if all the parties involved agree. The licence agreements, on the other hand, foresee a mandatory conciliation proceeding that constitutes a necessary step prior to arbitration. Conciliation under the production sharing contracts shall be conducted in accordance with UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules with a sole conciliator appointed either by the parties or by an undefined appointing authority agreed by the parties.24 The conciliation proceeding provided in the licence [Page418:] agreements consists simply of enquires made directly to the other party. A time limit of three months is set for conciliation in the production sharing contracts, whereas no time limit is set in the licence agreements.

As for the part of the model dispute resolution clause that provides for arbitration, it is flawed by inconsistencies and errors in all agreements that might make its application complicated and inefficient.

First, it provides for ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, not institutional arbitration. This may cause difficulties in the early stages of an arbitration because there will be no institution to manage initial communications between the parties and the constitution of the tribunal. Also, provisions on arbitrators' fees and procedural costs will be lacking.

The clause does not contemplate the possibility of multiparty arbitrations. The clause states that one arbitrator shall be appointed by the National Hydrocarbons Commission and another by the contractor. However, it is not uncommon for contractors that form part of a large consortium to have conflicting interests, so the consortium or the contractor may find itself at a disadvantage. This could be avoided if institutional arbitration were allowed as institutions have specific rules governing the appointment of tribunals in multiparty arbitrations.

The clause states that the place of arbitration shall be The Hague, Netherlands, which will almost certainly create logistical, economic and practical difficulties. For instance, the Hydrocarbons Law requires the arbitration to be conducted in Spanish, so any proceedings brought in the Dutch courts in relation to the arbitration will necessitate translations into Dutch, which risk being complex and expensive. Furthermore, the location of the seat may lead to costly travel for the parties, their counsel and the tribunal.

The clause states that any disputes related to unilateral termination are not arbitrable, despite the fact that this is already foreseen in the Hydrocarbons Law and the PEMEX Law. It would have been preferable not to mention this in the arbitration clause because it thereby also excludes the arbitrability of disputes over damages arising from unilateral termination or other consequences of unilateral termination, which, as discussed above, is unjustified.25 This exclusion is particularly worrying in the case of one of the production sharing contracts that is currently being negotiated, where it is stated not only that unilateral termination of the agreement cannot be submitted to arbitration, but also that 'all disputes arising from or related to unilateral termination by public authority or arising or related to any act of authority must be settled by the federal courts' (emphasis added). This wording excludes the arbitration of any dispute that arises from an act of authority or a sovereign decision, which ultimately means that it is impossible to arbitrate any dispute caused by the conduct of the National Hydrocarbons Commission, as this body is an authority.


In sum, there are several defects in the arbitration component of the model dispute resolution clause, which will very likely generate problems in the future. Investors in the hydrocarbons sector need to be aware of these defects and should endeavour to correct them in future negotiations..

5.6. Resolution of hydrocarbon-related disputes before Mexican authorities

Below we provide an overview of procedures for resolving hydrocarbon-related disputes that cannot be submitted to ADR but have to be settled by means other than court litigation.

5.6.1. Disputes related to the tender of hydrocarbon exploration/extraction agreements

The Hydrocarbons Law establishes a special regime for resolving disputes arising from the tender process relating to hydrocarbon exploration and extraction agreements. Such disputes must be decided by a federal court in a procedure designed to protect constitutional rights, the juicio de amparo indirecto. As stated in the Hydrocarbons Law, all acts related to tender processes and the allocation of hydrocarbon exploration and extraction contracts are matters of public policy and social interest, and it is for this reason that they are given this exceptional treatment.26

5.6.2. Disputes related to the use and occupation of land

The Energy Reform allows agreements to be made that provide for the use and occupation of land in order to develop hydrocarbon-related projects without having to acquire the land.27 Agreements of this kind have been particularly controversial28 in light of the Mexican Constitution's provisions on land ownership. Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution sets out the general principles and forms of land ownership and private property. There are two forms of property - the ejido and communal land, which date from the Mexican Revolution and were among the first social rights ever to be created - that are subject to strict conditions in order to ensure that the owner will remain owner so as to be able to obtain sustenance from the land. 29

The Hydrocarbons Law provides for three methods of resolving disputes arising from agreements relating to the use and occupation of such land:


(i) litigation in the federal civil courts when the plaintiff is the contractor that uses the land and the defendant is the owner; 30

(ii) litigation in a Unitary Agrarian Court, a judicial body for agrarian disputes that is part of the executive branch of government;31

(iii) mediation before the Agrarian, Territorial and Urban Development Secretariat, which is a government body (the mediation can cover only the acquisition, use and legal regime of the land to which the agreement relates).32

It is pleasing to see ADR present in this list in the form of mediation, but should be noted that, although the draft law allowed any kind of mediation, the Mexican Congress, when passing the law, limited it to government-controlled mediation as described above.33

6. Conclusion

The Energy Reform is undoubtedly a positive development in Mexican law, which will allow greater benefit to be drawn from Mexico's natural resources. It is also encouraging to see that the new energy laws are favourable to ADR. However, this aspect of the Energy Reform has several downsides. As has been explained, there is a lack of uniformity caused by unjustified differences in implementation. Of course, there is nothing to prevent a law establishing different treatment for a certain situation when it is justified by the particularity of the situation. However, the Mexican Congress has created unjustified differences of treatment for situations that are similar, and several issues have been regulated in a particular was for no legal or practical reason, which is counterproductive and detrimental to the purpose of the Energy Reform.

Managing partner of Von Wobeser y Sierra, S.C, Mexico; Vice-President of the ICC International Court of Arbitration, 2006-2015; cvonwobeser@vwys.com.mx.The author wishes to acknowledge the contribution of Montserrat Manzano and Rodrigo Macín to the preparation of this article.

See Nota informativa, Ley de Ingresos 2015, Centro de Estudios de las Finanzas Públicas, Cámara de Diputados, http://www.cefp.gob.mx/publicaciones/nota/2014/octubre/notacefp0602014.pdf (last accessed 22 June 2015).


In this article, 'energy sector' denotes the production and distribution of electrical energy and the exploitation of hydrocarbons.

According to Article 28 of the Mexican Constitution there are certain activities that only the government can develop. The Mexican Constitution states that these activities are 'strategic areas', the most important of which are the production of electricity and the use of hydrocarbons.

Newly enacted statutes: Hydrocarbons Law, Electricity Industry Law, Geothermic Energy Law, Hydrocarbons Revenue Law, Law of the Mexican Oil Stabilization and Development Fund, Law on Governmental Regulatory Entities for the Energy Sector, Law on Organization of National Agency for Industrial Security and Environmental Protection in the Energy Sector, PEMEX Law, CFE Law. Amended statutes: Foreign Investment Law, Mining Law, Public-Private Partnership Law, National Seas Law; Federal Government Fees Law, Tax Coordination Law, Law on Organization of Federal Public Administration, Law on Government-Controlled Entities, Law on Public Sector Acquisitions, Leases and Services, Law on Public Works and Related Services, Law on Federal Budget and Accountability, Public Debt Law. Enactment of ordinances relating to the Hydrocarbons Law and the Electricity Industry Law. Amendment of the ordinance relating to the Mining Law and the internal ordinance of the Agrarian, Territorial and Urban Development Secretariat.

Article 28 of Mexican Constitution forbids monopolies in Mexico. However, prior to the Energy Reform it described the use of hydrocarbons and production of electric energy by the government as a 'strategic area' that did not constitute a monopoly.

Articles 11-58 of the PEMEX Law (Ley de Petroleos Mexicanos) and Articles 10-57 of the Federal Electricity Commission Law (Ley de la Comisión Federal de Electricidad) regulate the corporate governance of these state-owned productive enterprises.

Articles 7 and 80 of the PEMEX Law; Articles 7 and 82 of the CFE Law. It is important to point out that only the legal relationships of these entities with the private sector are subject to the application of private law; all their other legal acts and relations continue to be regulated by administrative law.

Article 80 of the Law on Government Procurement, Leasing and Services; Article 98 of the Law on Government Procurement, Leasing and Services and the Law on Public Works and Related Services.

Article 27, para. 6, and Article 28, para. 8, of the Mexican Constitution.

Transitory Article 4 of the Constitutional Amendment.

Article 17, para. 4, of the Mexican Constitution states that: 'Laws shall provide the applicability of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms …'.

Article 21 the Hydrocarbons Law.

Article 72 of the abrogated PEMEX Law and Article 45 of the amended Law on the Public Service of Electric Energy.

Article 21 of the Hydrocarbons Law.

See section 1 above.

However, the jurisdiction of the federal courts is uncertain since the Hydrocarbons Law is silent on jurisdiction. It is the model dispute resolution clause (discussed below) that refers to their jurisdiction, yet the jurisdiction of courts should be established by statute, not in agreements, so the legal validity of the relevant provision in the model dispute resolution clause can be questioned.

Exploration and extraction agreements may also include other grounds for unilateral termination (i.e. contractual grounds). Although in such cases termination will be grounded in the contract rather than a statute, there has been discussion over whether such termination lies outside the scope of ADR and thus whether it is arbitrable.

Amparo en Revisión No. 358/2010, 11th Administrative Collegiate Court, 25 Aug. 2011, pp. 412-416.

This article was written in August 2015 and reflects the state of the law at that time.

The agreements are available at http://ronda1.gob.mx/ (last visited 8 July 2015).

All the agreements are substantially identical; any relevant differences between them will be mentioned below.

The lack of a predefined appointment authority is a clear defect in the conciliation provision.

See section 5.4 above.

Article 25, para. 2, of the Hydrocarbons Law.

Article 109 of the Hydrocarbons Law describes this as an easement (Servidumbre Legal de Hidrocarburos).

See M.T. Venegas Cruz, 'Los Métodos de Resolución de Controversias en la Reforma Energética', Von Wobeser y Sierra, Mexican Legal News, http://www.vonwobeserysierra.com/assets/files/PDF/news/nota-2014-agosto4.pdf (last visited on 26 June 2015).

Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution; Articles 43(51 of the Agrarian Law.

Article 106 I of the Hydrocarbons Law.


Article 106 II of the Hydrocarbons Law.

M.T. Venegas Cruz, supra note 28.