New Delhi, 14 September 2019

Inaugural Session

The Welcome Address was delivered via video link by Vikramjit Singh Sahney, President, ICC India. He announced that 2019 is the centenary year of the ICC and that the centenary celebrations were scheduled to take place on 6 December 2019 in New Delhi. Welcoming Hon’ble Mr Justice R.F. Nariman and other esteemed guests to the conference, Mr Sahney declared the conference open.

Alexis Mourre, President, ICC International Court of Arbitration, Paris, highlighted three reasons, which made 2019 a very important year for the ICC: first, the support of the highest authorities in India to make India a hub for international commercial arbitration; second, the centenary celebrations of ICC this year; and third, ICC being reported as the most preferred arbitral institution by a significant margin (77%).1

Alexander G. Fessas, Secretary General, ICC International Court of Arbitration, Paris, emphasised that in a world where multiple arbitral institutions exist, ICC is special because of its leading case management services, its status as the best expert forum and think tank in the field and its long relationship with institutions like the United Nations. He noted that the pool of Indians acting as arbitrators in ICC was currently over 16 and the recent amendments have made India an attractive jurisdiction for institutional arbitration.

Dr. Abhishek M. Singhvi, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India detailed three issues that arbitration in India is facing at the moment. First, the executive branch is taking belated zig-zag actions, the legislature is passing laws without analysis or proper discussions, and the judiciary is rendering inconsistent decisions which take years to correct. Second, India needs to achieve the standard of uniformity as that is what makes arbitration attractive. The way an arbitrator looks at a case in Jammu and Kashmir or Rajasthan, for instance, is very different from the way it is looked at in the territories which fall within the jurisdictions of the chartered High Courts, and sensitisation is very important to achieve uniformity. Third, arbitration in India is still too judge-centric and this needs to change. Dr. Singhvi concluded by saying that for a change to be brought, a concerted effort from all stakeholders is required.

The keynote address was given by Justice R.F. Nariman, Judge, Supreme Court of India. He noted that while arbitration law in India has moved forward, backward and sideways in the past, thanks to judicial and legislative corrections, all of this is behind us today as the 2015 Amendments were a ‘massive correction programme’.2 He criticised the non-inclusion of certain recommendations of the Justice Srikrishna Committee in the 2019 Amendments like model rules of procedure to be followed in domestic arbitrations, emergency awards to be incorporated in Section 2(1)(c) and a specialist arbitration bar and specialisation for judges via training, etc.3 He also expressed his reservation with respect to the insertion of Section 87, the introduction of prima facie case into Section 45 and the additional six months to be given for an award to be handed out. He then dwelled upon the achievements of the 2019 Amendments like setting up of an Arbitration Council of India and addition of the Eighth Schedule. Justice Nariman appreciated the general idea of an Arbitration Council and the importance given by the new Council to domestic and international arbitration and stressed that one of the key features is the formation of a standing committee to oversee that the Arbitration Act as well as the Arbitral Council to keep pace with the progress in international arbitration and to recommend amendments to the legislature as they become necessary.

Abhinav Bhushan, Director, South Asia, ICC Arbitration and ADR, Singapore, noted that India is a very important country for the world economy and is currently at a crossroads as far as arbitration is concerned. He proudly pointed out that recently, ICC appointed an Indian arbitrator in a completely non-Indian dispute.

Corruption in International Arbitration

Members of the panel: Amar Gupta, Partner, J. Sagar Associates, Delhi (moderator); Matthew Brown, Senior Associate, Clifford Chance, Singapore; Ila Kapoor, Partner, Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas, Delhi; Mohan Pillay, Partner, Joint Head of Office, Pinsent Masons, Singapore; Naresh Thacker, Partner, Economic Laws Practice, Mumbai.

The moderator Mr Gupta pointed out at the outset that the panel would be discussing corruption both in the realm of domestic and international arbitrations. In his first remark, Mr Thacker explained ‘corruption’ by referring to acts of bribery, misappropriation of property, undue influence, and obstruction of justice, which are often associated with corruption. Mr Thacker explicated that while there exists no universal definition of corruption, it may be useful to refer to the definition of corruption provided by Transparency International:

Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.4

Mr Thacker noted that when speaking of corruption in the realm of international arbitration, it becomes important to look at the applicable law. Mr Brown took this point further and said that the tribunal will ordinarily look at the governing law of contract to decide on a party’s conduct. However, the law of the seat as well as the public policy principles therein may also become significant in some specific cases such as those involving intermediary agreements. Ms Kapoor gave another example of this tendency – lobbying contracts. Such contracts are absolutely legal in the U.S. but their validity is questionable in India.

Mr Pally made a reference to the case Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation SA v. Hilmarton Ltd involving an intermediary contract.5 In this case, Hilmarton Limited contracted with Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation (‘OTV’) to procure a public contract for OTV in Algeria. It was known to the parties that the said arrangement breached Algerian law which prohibited the intervention of middlemen in such negotiations. The contract was governed by Swiss law and provided for arbitration in Switzerland under the rules of the ICC. Subsequently, a payment-related dispute arose and Hilmarton initiated arbitration, which ultimately resulted in an award in its favour. The tribunal rejected OTV’s request to dismiss Hilmarton’s claim on the ground that it violated the law of the contract’s place of performance (Algeria). The tribunal found that although Algerian law had been breached, there was no evidence of bribery or corruption. Nor had Swiss law or public policy been violated. Hilmarton sought enforcement of the award in the United Kingdom. OTV resisted enforcement on the ground that the contract was unlawful in its place of performance. The High Court refused to set aside a prior order giving effect to the award on the following reasoning:

An arbitration award, made under a foreign proper and curial law, which had specifically found that there was no corrupt practice should be enforced in England even if English law would have arrived at a different result on the ground that the underlying contract breached public policy because its performance involved a breach of statutory regulation in the place of performance.

In view of the above, Mr Pally remarked that the Omnium case would have taken an entirely different turn had an allegation of corruption or bribery been made in the matter.

The discussion then moved to the issue of bias and impartiality of an arbitrator. Ms Kapoor said that the 2015 Amendments introduced guidance in Indian law as to bias. Mr Thacker gave the example of government employees being appointed as arbitrators by the government itself in an arbitration against a private party.

In the context of Indian law, Mr Thacker pointed out that like other jurisdictions, India has no accepted definition of corruption. He stated that the law on corruption in India is covered by the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 but its application is restricted to public servants. Mr Thacker added that although the Indian Contract Act, 1872 gives a way out in cases of corruption in the private sphere, yet largely, corruption in private contracts goes unpunished in India unless a party makes it a contractual issue before the courts.

Mr Gupta then shifted the focus to the standard of proof applicable to corruption claims and stressed its significance in establishing corruption in international arbitrations. Mr Gupta expressed doubts as to whether in proving corruption the standard of proof would be a mere ‘preponderance of probabilities’ or would be ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’. Mr Brown pointed out that unlike in the case World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya,6 where corruption was quite apparent and openly admitted to by the claimant, corruption cases are usually very difficult to prove. Corrupt parties tend to mask their activities with great ingenuity thereby making it difficult for the party alleging corruption to produce physical evidence of corruption. Witnesses will also not come forward fearing criminal prosecution (as in most instances they might be involved in the corruption as well).

In international arbitration, he noted, the practice of tribunals remains largely inconsistent with respect to appropriate standard of proof that must be employed. Different tools have been applied by different tribunals depending on the seriousness of the accusation of corruption. Some commentators emphasise the ‘balance of proof test’ to say that if there are enough prima facie indicia, then the balance of proof must be reversed and the party objecting the corruption claim must show that there was no corruption. Others detail the ‘beyond reasonable doubt test’ which requires a strict threshold. Mr Brown also mentioned the ‘Hoffmann test’, which was laid down by Hoffmann L.J. in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman,7 wherein he illustrated how the inherent improbability of a particular alleged event may heighten the cogency of the evidence required to establish its occurrence:

It would need more cogent evidence to satisfy one that the creature seen walking in Regent’s Park was more likely than not to have been a lioness than to be satisfied to the same standard of probability that it was an Alsatian. On this basis, cogent evidence is generally required to satisfy a civil tribunal that a person has been fraudulent or behaved in some other reprehensible manner. But the question is always whether the tribunal thinks it more probable than not.

The final issue discussed pertained to the enforcement of arbitral awards in cases involving corruption. Mr Mohan explained that at that stage the court will see whether the issue was raised before the tribunal and the tribunal addressed it or not. Public policy considerations will usually promote setting aside the award where corruption is found. According to Mr Brown, in the event the national law of the seat of arbitration casts a mandatory duty on the tribunal to report reasonable suspicions of corrupt activities, then such a duty shall prevail notwithstanding the general obligation of confidentiality.

If an arbitrator sanctions a contract, which is subsequently found to be affected by corruption, the arbitrator in extreme circumstances would be facilitating corrupt activities and might himself be seen to be complicit in such corruption. Mr Brown referred to a recent case wherein an ICC Arbitration award was challenged before the Singapore High Court on the ground that the tribunal breached its duty to investigate the corruption allegations. Rejecting the challenge, the High Court held that the arbitral tribunal in the arbitration proceedings did not come under a duty to investigate the corruption allegations because the evidence submitted to support such allegations did not have any bearing on the issues in the arbitration proceedings.8 However, the Court added that in appropriate cases, an arbitral tribunal (i) may have the duty to investigate allegations of corruption which affect the issues under consideration in the arbitration and (ii) a breach of the duty to investigate would carry the risk of legitimizing corrupt activities.

Ms Kapoor referred to Swiss Timing Limited v. Commonwealth Games 2010 Organising Committee,9 where the respondent attempted to resist going to arbitration on the ground that the contract between the parties was procured by corruption, and sought to rely upon the criminal case that had been initiated against the Chairman of the respondent and other officials on the allegations of corruption, cheating and other fraudulent acts. The respondent argued that if the arbitration proceeding continues simultaneously with the criminal proceedings, it would result in conflicting decisions by the two fora leading to unnecessary confusion. Rejecting the contentions of the respondent, the Supreme Court of India held that it is mandatory for courts to refer disputes to arbitration, if the agreement between parties provides for reference to arbitration. Registering of criminal case as to execution of the said contract is not an absolute bar to refer disputes to arbitration. Further, the Court held that there is no inherent risk of prejudice to any party in permitting arbitration to proceed simultaneously with criminal proceedings since the findings recorded by arbitral tribunal are not binding in criminal proceedings. In an eventuality where ultimately the award is rendered and the criminal proceedings result in conviction, necessary plea can be taken on the basis of such conviction to resist enforcement of the award. However, if the matter is not referred to arbitration and the criminal trial results in acquittal leaving no ground for claiming that the underlying contract is void or voidable, it would result in undesirable delay in arbitration.

Ms Kapoor further referred to A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam & Ors.10 that held as follows:

[A] mere allegation of fraud simplicitor may not be a ground to nullify the effect of arbitration agreement between the parties. It is only in those cases where the Court, while dealing with Section 8 of the Act, finds that there are very serious allegations of fraud which make a virtual case of criminal offence or where allegations of fraud are so complicated that it becomes absolutely essential that such complex issues can be decided only by civil court on the appreciation of the voluminous evidence that needs to be produced, the Court can sidetrack the agreement by dismissing application under Section 8 and proceed with the suit on merits. It can be so done also in those cases where there are serious allegations of forgery/fabrication of documents in support of the plea of fraud or where fraud is alleged against the arbitration provision itself or is of such a nature that permeates the entire contract, including the agreement to arbitrate, meaning thereby in those cases where fraud goes to the validity of the contract itself of the entire contract which contains the arbitration clause or the validity of the arbitration clause itself. Reverse position thereof would be that where there are simple allegations of fraud touching upon the internal affairs of the party inter se and it has no implication in the public domain, the arbitration clause need not be avoided and the parties can be relegated to arbitration.

In the classic case of Soleimany v. Soleimany,11 an allegation of corruption was made and after examining the circumstances, the tribunal concluded that corruption existed, but allowed the enforcement of the contract. While adjudicating the dispute between the parties, the tribunal recognized not just illegality, but also some elements of corruption but nevertheless held the contract to be valid and enforceable and rendered an award in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff then applied to the High Court in England to register the award as a judgment. The defendant resisted the enforcement of award on the grounds that illegality rendered the plaintiff's claim void or unenforceable in an English court, and that it would be contrary to public policy for an award founded on an illegal agreement or transaction to be enforced as a judgment of the High Court. The judge refused the defendant’s application holding, inter alia, that a contract, otherwise unenforceable for illegality, became enforceable if the procedural law of the arbitration attached no significance to the illegality. On appeal by the defendant, the UK Court of Appeal declined to enforce the award. The Court observed that as the illegality (smuggling) in the place of performance was apparent on the face of the award, the Court should decline to enforce the award as being contrary to public policy, despite the fact that the contract was enforceable under the parties’ chosen law.

Mr Pally pointed out that the court in the Omnium case distinguished the Soleimany case. The key difference between the Omnium case and the Soleimany case was that the latter concerned a domestic award in which the illicit nature of the contract was apparent on the face of the award and the former concerned a New York Convention award with the attendant public policy in favour of enforcing foreign arbitration awards and there was no finding of corruption or illicit practice.

During a lively Q&A session, panellists then answered the following questions:

  • If one of the three arbitrators is corrupt, what happens to the disclosure obligations of the other two? If known by the other arbitrators, it is their duty to disclose corruption of the third arbitrator.
  • What happens to the award if the corruption is at the instance of the arbitrator who delivered the minority award? If the majority award is tainted with corruption, it will affect the validity of the award, but it is difficult to answer the impact of a tainted minority award.

Summarizing the discussion, the moderator stressed that:

  • There are two kinds of corruption – one is where there is a general consensus internationally on what amounts to corruption; and the second is where the legitimacy of the alleged act is open to question depending on the jurisdiction where the activity is undertaken e.g. in cases relating to intermediary agreements, lobbying agreements, etc.
  • Regarding the duty of an arbitral tribunal to investigate corruption, there appears to be a consensus among authorities that a tribunal must adjudicate upon such issues even in the absence of any allegations in cases where evidence of corruption exists, and the tribunal deems it appropriate to do so.
  • With respect to cases where parties make allegations of corruption, arbitral tribunals are open to adopting special procedures in cases of corruption and seem willing to accept circumstantial evidence and draw adverse inferences against corrupt parties. However, there exists a requirement of producing cogent evidence for establishing allegations of corruption in arbitration matters.
  • Most jurisdictions the courts are reluctant to interfere with arbitral awards if the tribunal has adjudicated upon the issues relating to corruption and that such interference by courts is confined to cases where the tribunal proceeds to enforce a contract despite noting the existence of corruption therein.

Guerrila Tactics in Indian Arbitration

Members of the panel: Sanjeev Kapoor, Partner, Khaitan & Co., Delhi (moderator); Manish Aggarwal, Partner, Three Crowns LLP, London; Moazzam Khan, Partner and Head – Global Litigation, Nishith Desai Associates, Delhi; Montek Mayal, Senior Managing Director, FTI Consulting, Delhi; Shankh Sengupta, Partner, Trilegal, Delhi.

The moderator Mr Kapoor opened the session with a simple question: How do you identify a guerrilla tactic?

According to Mr Kapoor, the concept of ‘guerrilla tactics’ in arbitrations would differ for lawyers coming from varied cultures and ethical backgrounds. To substantiate his point, Mr Kapoor illustrated that when it comes to witness preparation for an English solicitor, it would be very unethical for him to prepare the witness before his cross-examination, whereas, for a US attorney not preparing the witness before his deposition may amount to malpractice.

Mr Aggarwal elucidated the meaning of the term ‘guerrilla tactics’ by describing them as a conscious use of unconventional tactics which is designed to delay, disrupt, obstruct and sabotage the arbitral process, the very aim of which is to undermine the integrity of the process and the procedural predictability attached to adjudication so as to avoid a consideration of the substantive issues in dispute. He remarked that simply because such tactics may be permitted by law it does not mean that such practices are appropriate.

Moving on, Mr Sengupta stressed that parties may resort to guerrilla tactics at any of the following stages:

  • Before reference to arbitration – a party may not agree to the existence of a dispute to be referred to arbitration or cause undue delay in the constitution of arbitral tribunal.
  • During the conduct of arbitral proceedings – a party may seek extension of timelines time and again.
  • Post-award stage – a party may raise several unmeritorious challenges to the enforcement of arbitral award.

Mr Khan added that arbitration has come up with ingenious tactics not seen in litigation. He gave two examples from the discovery stage: (i) the tactic of asking for everything under the sun and then fishing out the relevant points; and (ii) the tactic of over-complying with a request for discovery by sharing too many documents with the other party.

Although purpose of employment of an expert’s services is not to disrupt the proceedings but to reduce the tension and disagreement between parties with an objective of obtaining better results, Mr Mayal noted that unfortunately, parties are increasingly resorting to engaging experts in arbitrations for the sole reason of derailing, delaying and confusing the adjudication process. Pointing out the fallacies with the use of experts in Indian arbitrations, Mr Mayal said that dumping an expert report of 500 pages with 15,000 exhibits is a guerrilla tactic where only 45 pages and three exhibits are relevant. Experts are increasingly being used as a tool to introduce new factual evidence throughout the proceedings.

Highlighting the constraints that lawyers face, Mr Sengupta pointed out that lawyers are not guerrillas, they are made guerrillas at the behest of some clients.

The moderator then shifted to guerrilla tactics in an investment arbitration as opposed to an international commercial arbitration. Mr Aggarwal said that involvement of the State in investment arbitrations adds a whole new dimension to guerrilla tactics. Courts, tax authorities, tribunals, bureaucracy within the State body (leading to delays) are tools available with the State to complicate things, which private parties do not possess. For example, in Union of India v. Khaitan Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd.12 the Delhi High Court held that courts can interfere in foreign seated investor-state dispute settlement awards if there are ‘rare and compelling circumstances’. This, in the opinion of Mr Aggarwal, is a very vague standard which opens up space for guerrillas. He referred to a subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court wherein it was held that the Indian courts have the jurisdiction to grant anti-BIT arbitration injunctions, which may be granted in ‘rare and compelling circumstances’. According to Mr Aggarwal, this expression has sown the seeds for a long disruption in ISDS claims involving Indian parties because of a lack of clarity on what would amount to exceptional circumstances calling for such interference by the Indian courts.

Mr Aggarwal pointed out that it is common for the host States to use their police powers, criminal investigative powers, taxation powers, etc. to retaliate against the investor for bringing a claim against them or to stall the adjudication process. Mr Aggarwal cited the following cases:

  • Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. Republic of Indonesia.13 This was a UNCITRAL arbitration seated in Jakarta, where the Indonesian state-owned-company Pertamina, albeit not party to the arbitration, obtained an anti-arbitration injunction from the Indonesian courts. The tribunal moved the hearing venue to the Hague and decided to proceed with the arbitration on the ground that the said injunction was issued without requisite jurisdiction. However, when the State’s co-arbitrator tried to participate in the arbitration, against warnings given to him at home, he was intercepted by the Indonesian State officials and was accompanied back to Jakarta as soon as he arrived at the airport in Amsterdam. The remaining two arbitrators declined to suspend the arbitration and convened the hearing while refusing the objection to their acting as a truncated tribunal in light of the existing precedents and concluded that:

The weight of well established international authority makes clear that an arbitral tribunal has not only the right, but the obligation, to proceed when, without valid excuse, one of its members fails to act, or withdraws or – although not the case here – purports to resign.

  • ConocoPhillips v. Venezuela.14 In this case, the claims had arisen out of Venezuela’s nationalization of three oil projects in which the claimants had interests, after having increased their applicable royalty rate and income tax. The case started in 2007 and the final award came to be rendered in 2018. It took 12 years for the matter to be decided and in that case ConocoPhillips had appointed Fortier L.Y. as its arbitrator. Venezuela challenged his appointment on an unprecedented six different occasions in those 12 years.

In his concluding remarks, Mr Aggarwal pointed out the growing need for arbitrators to have more power in controlling counsel conduct in arbitration proceedings. According him, one way of achieving that is if the arbitrators use their power of imposing costs on parties liberally where parties make frivolous procedural applications or artificial challenges to jurisdiction. Mr Aggarwal further added that arbitrators may also consider ordering costs on an interim basis instead of reserving it for the final stage of the proceedings. Lastly, Mr Aggarwal suggested that arbitrators might also use the tool of drawing adverse inferences against parties in appropriate cases.

In his closing remarks, Mr Sengupta insisted on ‘self-regulation’ as an effective way to deal with the growing menace of guerrilla tactics while admitting that it is a difficult course to take when the instructions from clients are to delay the proceedings.

Oxford Style Debate: ‘This house believes that the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019 is progressive for the Arbitration ecosystem in India’

The jury: Salim Moollan QC, Essex Court Chambers, London; Percival Billimoria, Head of Chambers, Chambers of P S Billimoria, Delhi; Barrister, Outer Temple Chambers, London; Niti Dixit, Partner S&R Associates, Delhi.

For the motion: Madhavi Divan, Additional Solicitor General of India and Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India; Ritin Rai, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India.

Against the motion: Nakul Dewan, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India; Barrister, 20 Essex Street, Singapore/ London; Fereshte D Sethna, Founder & Managing Partner, DMD Advocates, Mumbai.

Supporting the motion: The traditional notion of arbitration in India is characterised as a post-retirement perk for judges, but the new amendments are all set to change this laidback understanding of arbitration. Setting the scope of the debate, it was noted that the challenges faced in India are unique and endemic and therefore, any comparison to London or any other jurisdiction must be avoided.

Opposing the motion: The 2019 Amendments take us three steps back: (1) The idea of an Arbitration Council of India is unprecedented; such a regulatory body with unlimited powers does not exist anywhere in the world and India too does not need it. (2) The proposed Section 43C – which concerns the composition of the Arbitration Council and requires that its Chairperson be appointed by the Central Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of India – will bring back controversy to this appointment because the Chief Justice will be read as the Collegium. (3) Coming to the grading system of arbitral institutions, it was raised whether there was any need for such a ‘beauty contest’.

Supporting the motion (and countering the arguments of the opposite side concerning the unlimited powers of the Arbitration Council): There is not a single provision which says that the Arbitration Council is going to be a regulator of arbitration in India with unbridled powers. It was submitted that the sole agenda of the Council is to promote arbitration by engaging all stakeholders and it is not given anywhere in the text that grading/accreditation is mandatory to be appointed under the amended Act. Asserting the progressiveness of the amendments, the speakers alleged that the amendments brought clarity to the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz; a much-needed change to the Section 11.

Opposing the motion: Section 87 of the new amendments goes back to the same position before Nariman J.’s judgment in BCCI v. Kochi Cricket Pvt Ltd.15 Hence, the Government had done a disservice to all the stakeholders by reversing this judgment. Further, due to the 2019 amendments, district judges will have to grapple with the question of an international commercial arbitration. Finally, the 2019 Amendments have reversed the clear steps identified in 2015 towards paving the way for execution of international commercial arbitration awards.

Following a very interesting Q&A session between the jury and the debaters with some participation from the audience, the jury found it tough to decide a winner and declared a draw among the teams.

Queen Mary, University of London and White & Case, ‘2018 International Arbitration Survey: The Evolution of International Arbitration’ at 13,

The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2015 may be accessed at; the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 may be accessed here:

The 2019 Amendment Act can be accessed at


High Court of England and Wales, 24 May 1999, [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 146.

World Duty Free Company Limited v. The Republic of Kenya, (Award dated 4 Oct. 2006). The tribunal found that the contract under which the claimant brought its claims was procured by the payment of a cash bribe to the then sitting President of Kenya, and on that basis held that the claimant’s claims should be dismissed immediately and in their entirety.

House of Lords, [2001] UKHL 47, [2003] 1 AC 153.

China Machine New Energy Corp v. Jaguar Energy Guatemala LLC and Anr., [2018] SGHC 101.

Supreme Court of India, (2014) 6 SCC 677.

Supreme Court of India, (2016) 10 SCC 386. This case was followed by a plethora of judgments where the courts have refused to hear a party on the ground of fraud.

English Court of Appeal reversing the High Court decision to enforce the arbitral award, [1999] QB 785.

Union of India v. Khaitan Holdings (Mauritius) Limited & Ors., 2019 SCC Online Del 6755 (

Himpurna California Energy Ltd. v. Republic of Indonesia, XXV YBCA 186 (2000), 194 (Final award of 16 Oct. 1999).

ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips Hamaca B.V. and ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (

Supreme Court of India, (2018) 6 SCC 287.